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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joseph A. Knight timely appealed form the district court's judgment of conviction. 
On appeal, Mr. Knight asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress the State's evidence. Specifically, he argues that the district court erred when 
it ruled that his mere presence at a residence when a search warrant was executed 
created probable cause to arrest him for the offense of "frequenting."1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
During the summer of 2013, Detective Wadsworth was investigating Charles 
Ziebach whom Detective Wadsworth suspected was trafficking in methamphetamine. In 
June and July of 2013, Detective Wadsworth and a confidential informant conducted 
two controlled purchases of methamphetamine at Mr. Ziebach's home. (Tr., p.11, Ls.7-
1 O; Defendant's Exhibit 1, pp.4-5.) Detective Wadsworth monitored both of these 
controlled buys with a radio device, and Mr. Knight's name was never mentioned. 
(Tr., p.16, L.10- p.17, L.17.) 
On August 19, 2013, Detective Wadsworth searched Mr. Ziebach's garbage and 
found items he associated with drug use. (Defendant's Exhibit 1, p.5.) While Detective 
Wadsworth found letters addressed to Mr. Ziebach, he did not find any documents 
referencing Mr. Knight. (Tr., p.18, L.14 - p.20, L.19.) After Mr. Ziebach's garbage was 
searched, Detective Wadsworth obtained a search warrant for Mr. Ziebach's home; the 
warrant did not mention Mr. Knight. ( See generally Defendant's Exhibit 1; R., pp.150-
151.) 
1 The offense commonly referred to as "frequenting" is codified in I.C. § 37-2732(d). 
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Approximately two hours prior to the execution of the warrant, Officer McClure 
with several other officers placed Mr. Ziebach's home under surveillance. (Tr., p.10, 
L.23 - p.11, L.15, p.36, L.9 - p.37, L.17.) Officer McClure did not observe Mr. Knight 
while surveilling Mr. Ziebach's residence. (Tr., p.37, Ls.13-17.) 
When the search warrant was executed, members of a SWAT team blocked the 
front and back doors of Mr. Ziebach's home. (Tr., p.25, Ls.4-23, p.38, Ls.6-15.) All of 
the occupants in Mr. Ziebach's home were handcuffed and removed from the residence. 
(R., p.151.) According to Detective Wadsworth, every person found in the house was 
supposed to be handcuffed for officer safety but not arrested. (Tr., p.26, L.20 - p.27, 
L.1.) However, Officer McClure testified that the plan was to arrest everyone found in 
Mr. Ziebach's home for the offense of frequenting. (Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.40, L.19, p.95, 
L.20 - p.96, L.3.) 
Mr. Knight was one of the people secured by the SWAT team.2 (Tr., p.25, L.25 -
p.26, L.1.) After being removed from Mr. Ziebach's home, Detective Vanderschaaf was 
instructed to conduct a "pat-down" search of Mr. Knight. (Tr., p.76, L.6 - p.77, L.5.) The 
purpose of this search was to look for both weapons and contraband. (Tr., p.76, L.6 -
p.77, L.5.) Prior to the pat down search of Mr. Knight, Detective Vanderschaaf testified 
that he visually inspected Mr. Knight and he was wearing a T-shirt and jeans. (Tr., p. 78, 
L.16 - p.79, L.14.) Detective Vanderschaaf also testified that did not notice any bulges 
in Mr. Knight's pockets. (Tr., p.78, L.16 - p.79, L.14.) 
While patting down Mr. Knight, Detective Vanderschaaf felt something in 
Mr. Knight's pocket that he knew was not a weapon. (Tr., p.82, Ls.11-14.) From the 
initial touching, Detective Vanderschaaf could not tell if the contents of Mr. Knight's 
2 
pocket were contraband. (Tr., p.83, Ls.11-17.) In order to determine what was in 
Mr. Knight's pocket, Detective Vanderschaaf grabbed, squeezed, and felt the contents 
of Mr. Knight's pocket. (Tr., p.73, Ls.1-12, p.78, Ls.4-15.) Detective Vanderschaaf then 
emptied the contents of Mr. Knight's pocket and he discovered a straw and a baggie 
which he thought were drug paraphernalia. (Tr., p.80, L.16- p.81, L.3, p.73, L.16- p.74, 
L.5.) Mr. Knight was eventually arrested. (R., p.150.) 
Sometime after Mr. Knight was removed from Mr. Ziebach's house, Detective 
Wadsworth entered the home and discovered methamphetamine and paraphernalia 
located in a safe, which was in a closet in Mr. Ziebach's master bedroom. (Tr., p.14, 
Ls.2-16.) There is nothing in the record indicating that either drugs or drug 
paraphernalia were found elsewhere in the residence. (See generally, Tr.) 
After Mr. Knight was arrested, he was charged, by information, with possession 
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and an enhancement for previously being 
convicted for an offense under the Uniform Controlled Substance Act.3 (R., pp.36-39.) 
Mr. Knight filed a suppression motion and supporting memorandums, wherein he 
argued that his mere presence at Mr. Ziebach's home at the time the arrest warrant was 
executed did not create probable cause to arrest him for frequenting. (R., pp.60-61, 
105-125, 139-149.) Mr. Knight also argued, among other things, that Detective 
Vanderschaaf's decision to empty Mr. Knight's pockets was an illegal warrantless 
search because there was no evidence indicating that Mr. Knight was formally under 
arrest at that time. (R., pp.105-125, 139-149.) The district court denied Mr. Knight's 
2 However, there is nothing in the record indicating that Mr. Knight was armed and 
dangerous. See Section l(D), infra. 
3 It does not appear that Mr. Knight was ever charged or citied for frequenting. 
(R., pp.36-39; Defendant's Exhibit 1, pp.4-5, Defendant's Exhibit 3, p.1.) 
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motion to suppress, ruling that since Mr. Knight was in Mr. Ziebach's home at the time 
the search warrant was issued, there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Knight for 
frequenting. (R., p.156.) The district court then ruled that the warrantless search of 
Mr. Knight was a search incident to an arrest and that the exact timing of Mr. Knight's 
arrest was irrelevant because there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Knight for 
frequenting prior to the time he was searched by Detective Vanderschaaf. (R., pp.154-
156.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Knight pleaded guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance and preserved his ability to challenge the denial of his suppression 
motion on appeal. (R., pp.163-172.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed 








The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Knight's Motion To Suppress The State's 
Evidence 
A. Introduction 
In order to incur criminal liability for the offense of frequenting, the defendant 
must actually know that s/he was in a place where drug activity was occurring. 
I.C. § 37-2732(d). Due to this knowledge element, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held 
that mere presence alone at a place where a drug related search warrant was executed 
does not establish probable cause for the offense of frequenting. State v. Crabb, 107 
Idaho 298 (Ct. App. 1984 ). In this case, the district court ruled that Mr. Knight's mere 
Mr. home created probable cause to him for frequenting. 
As such, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Knight's suppression motion, 
because the basis for that ruling was rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Crabb. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Idaho appellate courts apply a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to 
a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. First, an appellate court defers to the 
district court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., 
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485 (2009). Second, this Court reviews de nova 
the trial court's application of constitutional and legal principles to the facts as found. Id. 
at 485-486. 
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The Search Incident To Arrest Exception To The Warrant Requirement Was Not 
Applicable To the Search Of Mr. Knight Because His Mere Presence At 
Mr. Ziebach's Home At The Time The Search Warrant Was Executed Did Not 
Give Rise To Probable Cause For the Offense Of Frequenting 
Mr. Knight has liberty interests which are protected by the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, which provides that "[t}he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated." Further, Mr. Knight has similar liberty interests 
protected under Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. See State v. Christensen, 
131 Idaho 143, 146 (1998) ("Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of Art. I, § 17 is 
to protect Idaho citizens' 
governmental intrusion."). 
expectation of privacy arbitrary 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Tyler, 153 
Idaho 623, 626 (Ct. App. 2012). The State has the burden to establish the applicability 
of an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App 
2001 ). A search incident to a lawful arrest is exempted from the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement. State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 215 (Ct. App. 1984 ). A warrantless 
arrest and warrantless search incident to that arrest can legally occur in the event the 
arresting officer has probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a public 
offense. Id. If an arresting officer has probable cause to believe that an arrestee 
committed an offense, a search incident to an arrest can legally occur before the 
arrestee is formally arrested. Id. 
Probable cause is information which would lead a person of ordinary care and 
prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the subject of 
arrest is guilty. State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 677 ( 1979). Moreover, a probable cause 
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determination must be made on particularized facts. State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 
283 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Even though the record does not reflect whether Mr. Knight was searched before 
or after he was formally arrested, the district court ruled that Detective Vanderschaaf's 
search of Mr. Knight was exempted from the warrant requirement as a search incident 
to an arrest because Detective Vanderschaaf had probable cause to believe that 
Mr. Knight was guilty of frequenting before he searched Mr. Knight. (R., pp.153-156.) 
According to the district court: 
Here, where the officers had probable cause to believe that the location 
was being used as a drug house, there was also probable cause to 
believe that anyone inside the house would have knowledge of the 
purpose for which the house was being used. Thus, there was probable 
cause to believe that anyone in the house was frequenting and could be 
arrested for that crime. Such an arrest determination was made by the 
officers prior to the search, for everyone the officers located in the 
residence. 
(R., pp.156-157.) However, Mr. Knight's mere presence in Mr. Ziebach's home at the 
time the search warrant was executed, alone, is not enough to establish probable cause 
for the offense of frequenting, because the applicable statue, I.C. § 37-2732(d), required 
Mr. Knight to have actual knowledge that Mr. Ziebach's home was being used as a 
place to either sell or consume drugs. Idaho Code Section 37-2732(d) follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises 
of any place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being 
manufactured or cultivated, or are being held for distribution, 
transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be given away. A 
violation of this section shall deem those persons guilty of a misdemeanor 
and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not more than three 
hundred dollars ($300) and not more than ninety (90) days in the county 
jail, or both. 
I.C. § 37-2732(d) (emphasis added). Mere presence in Mr. Ziebach's residence alone 
was not enough evidence to establish probable cause to believe that Mr. Knight was 
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guilty of frequenting because law enforcement must have some particularized evidence 
indicating that Mr. Knight actually knew Mr. Ziebach's home was being used for drug 
activity. Gibson, 141 Idaho at 283. For example, if drugs or drug paraphernalia were 
found in plain view in the area were Mr. Knight was initially found in Mr. Ziebach's 
home, then a person reasonably could conclude the Mr. Knight was aware that drugs 
were either being sold, used, or given away at Mr. Ziebach's home. Absent such a 
particularized fact, there is no evidence which could be used to support the conclusion 
that Mr. knight actually knew Mr. Ziebach's home was being used for drug related 
activates. 
Support for Mr. Knight's argument can be found in State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298 
(Ct. App. 1984 ). In that case, an undercover investigator, Douglas Williams, received a 
call from Robert Shook, who offered to sell him some cocaine. Id at. 301. Mr. Shook 
said he needed to get the cocaine from his "source", and that Mr. Shook and the 
"source" would meet Mr. Williams in a parking lot. Id. After Mr. Williams ended his 
phone call with Mr. Shook, a second investigator, who was surveilling Mr. Shook, 
observed Mr. Shook leave his residence and go to a mobile home. Id. Mr. Shook and 
another man left the mobile home and met Mr. Williams in a parking lot, where money 
and cocaine exchanged hands. Id. A few minutes after this transaction, Mr. Shook and 
his companion were stopped and arrested. Id. 
Based upon on the testimony of Mr. Williams and the second investigator, a 
search warrant was issued for a nighttime search of the mobile home. Id. Later that 
same evening, law enforcement executed the search warrant. Id. While executing the 
search warrant, Mr. Crabb appeared at the entrance of the mobile home and was 
immediately placed under arrest for frequenting. Id. Mr. Crabb was then taken into the 
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mobile home where law enforcement found a small amount of marijuana in plain view 
on a coffee table. Id. Mr. Crabb was then searched and law enforcement discovered 
marijuana and methamphetamine. Id. Mr. Crabb filed a motion to suppress evidence 
which was denied. Id. Mr. Crabb appealed. Id. 
On appeal, Mr. Crabb argued, based on the requirement in I.C. § 37-2732(d) that 
the defendant have actual knowledge that the residence was being used for drug 
activity, his mere presence at the mobile home at the time law enforcement executed 
the search warrant did not create probable cause to arrest him for frequenting. Id. at 
303. The Court of Appeals agreed, reasoning that that "statute requires a person 
'frequent a place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being held for 
distribution,' etc." Id. (original emphasis). "The statute precludes the interpretation that 
a person violated the statute simply by his presence at a place where controlled 
substances are sold." Id. The Court of Appeals went on to hold: 
The officers in the present case arrested Crabb the moment he 
appeared at the door of the mobile home. They did not then have reason 
to suspect that Crabb knew that illegal controlled substances were being 
held at that place. Thus, Crabb was arrested for his mere presence at a 
place suspected of containing controlled substances. While the officers 
may have had the right to detain Crabb for investigation during the 
ensuing search of the premises pursuant to a valid warrant, they had no 
right to arrest him or search his person at that time. Therefore, the search 
of Crabb's person cannot be upheld as a search incident to ... [an] arrest. 
Id. (original emphasis). 
Further support for Mr. Knight's argument can be found in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 
U.S. 85 (1979), where the United States Supreme court held: 
It is true that the police possessed a warrant based on probable 
cause to search the tavern in which Ybarra happened to be at the time the 
warrant was executed. But, a person's mere propinquity to others 
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give 
rise to probable cause to search that person. Where the standard is 
probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by 
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probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This 
requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact 
that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another 
or to search the premises where the person may happen to be. 
Id. at 91; see also United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948) ("[A] person, by 
mere presence in a suspected car, [does not lose] immunities from search of his person 
to which he would otherwise be entitled."). Based on the foregoing, the district court 
erred when it ruled that Detective Vanderschaaf had probable cause to arrest Mr. Knight 
for frequenting merely based on Mr. Knight's presence at Mr. Ziebach's home at the 
time the arrest warrant was executed. 
Additionally, there are no facts in this record indicating that Mr. Knight knew that 
Mr. Ziebach's home was being used for drug related activities. Detective Wadsworth 
monitored both of the controlled buys which occurred at Mr. Ziebach's home in June 
and July of 2013, and never heard Mr. Knight's name mentioned during those 
transactions. (Tr., p.16, L.10 - p.18, L.13.) Detective Wadsworth did not discover any 
information during the search of Mr. Ziebach's garbage that connected Mr. Knight to 
Mr. Ziebach or Mr. Ziebach's home. (Tr., p.18, L.14 - p.20, L.19.) Officer McClure did 
not observe Mr. Knight while he was surveilling Mr. Ziebach's home prior to the 
execution of the search warrant. (Tr., p.36, L.9 - p.37, L.17.) Detective Vanderschaaf 
testified that his first encounter with Mr. Knight, in regard to this matter, was after the 
search warrant was executed. (Tr., p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.23.) 
While Detective Vanderschaaf and Officer McClure had previous interactions 
with Mr. Knight, the record does not disclose the nature of those contacts as being 
either innocent interactions in the community or criminally related interactions. 
(Tr., p.40, L.25 - p.41, L.12, p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.15.) Further, Detective Wadsworth had 
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no prior interactions with Mr. Knight and first "became familiar" with him after the search 
warrant was executed. (Tr., p.10, Ls.21-24.) 
There was no evidence found in plain view during the search of Mr. Ziebach's 
home which would indicate that the people present in that home when the search 
warrant was executed would have been aware that the home was being used for drug 
related activity. After the occupants of Mr. Ziebach's home were handcuffed and the 
home was secured, Detective Wadsworth discovered methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia located in a safe, which was in a closet in Mr. Ziebach's master bedroom. 
(Tr., p.14, Ls.2-16, p.26, L.2 - p.27, L.10, p.37, L.18 - p.39, L.10; R., p.151.) There is no 
other evidence indicating that drugs or drug paraphernalia were discovered elsewhere 
in Mr. Ziebach's home. (See generally Tr.) Additionally, there is no evidence that any 
of the occupant's of Mr. Ziebach's home implicated Mr. Knight in drug related activities. 
(See generally, Tr.) Moreover, the items found in Mr. Ziebach's safe were found after 
Mr. Knight was searched by Officer Vanderschaaf. (Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.31, L.4.) As 
such, the discovery of that contraband could not be used to establish probable cause 
that Mr. Knight was aware that Mr. Ziebach's home was being used for drug related 
activities at the time he was searched by Detective Vanderschaaf. (Tr., p.30, L.23 -
p.31, L.4.) 
In sum, the district court held that Mr. Knight's mere presence at Mr. Ziebach's 
home at the time the search warranted was executed created probable cause to believe 
that Mr. Knight actually knew that Mr. Ziebach's home was being used for drug related 
activity. The district court erred because the Idaho Court of Appeals has previously held 
that mere presence alone when a search warrant is executed is not enough to establish 
probable cause for the offense of frequenting. Since the State did not produce any 
12 
evidence which would indicate that Mr. Knight was aware of the fact that Mr. Ziebach's 
home was being used for drug activity it failed to meets its burden to establish the 
applicability of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. 
D. The Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Weapons Frisk Exception To The Warrant 
Requirement Was Not Applicable To Detective Vanderschaaf's Search Of 
Mr. Knight 
Another exception to the warrant requirement is commonly referred to as the 
stop-and-frisk-exception.4 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court held that after an individual is detained based on reasonable suspicion 
that criminal activity is afoot, the officer may frisk for weapons if s/he has a reasonable 
belief that the suspect is armed and the officer is concerned for his safety. "An officer 
may frisk an individual if the officer can point to specific and articulable facts that would 
lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the individual with whom the officer is 
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous and nothing in the initial stages of the 
encounter serves to dispel this belief." State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 626 (Ct. App. 
2012). In analyzing whether a weapons frisk was warranted, courts "look to the facts 
known to the officer on the scene and the inferences of risk of danger reasonably drawn 
from the totality of those specific circumstances." Id. 
In this case, there are no particularized facts which support the conclusion that 
Mr. Knight posed a threat to officer safety after he was handcuffed and removed from 
4 Mr. Knight is not challenging his initial detention because "a warrant to search for 
contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to 
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (footnote omitted). 
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home. Officer McClure that Mr. hands were handcuffed 
behind his back when he was initially detained. ) When 
Wadsworth arrived at Mr. Ziebach's home he observed Mr. Knight sitting on 
ground with his arms handcuffed and behind his back. (Defendant's Exhibit 2; 
Tr., p.27, L.5 - p.28, L.23.) Prior to the search of Mr. Knight, Detective Vanderschaaf 
testified that he visually inspected Mr. Knight and he was wearing a T-shirt and jeans. 
(Tr., p.78, L.16 - p.79, L.7; Defendant's Exhibit 2.) Detective Vanderschaaf testified that 
upon his visual inspection of Mr. Knight he did not notice any bulges in Mr. Knight's 
pockets. (Tr., p.79, Ls.8-14.) Detective Vanderschaaf also testified that he could not 
see into Mr. Knight's pockets or otherwise tell from his visual observations that 
Mr. Knight had anything in his pockets. (Tr., p.85, Ls.5-14.) As such, Detective 
Vanderschaaf did not observe any bulge which would lead a reasonable person to 
believe Mr. Knight was armed. 
There is no evidence in the record indicating that law enforcement perceived 
Mr. Knight as a credible threat to their safety. Detective Vanderschaaf testified that at 
the time he searched Mr. Knight, other present law enforcement officers did not have 
their weapons drawn and the weapons were either "slung" or "holstered." (Tr., p.79, 
L.25 - p.80, L. 7.) When asked if he perceived any risk of danger to himself or 
Mr. Knight when he conducted the initial pat-down search of Mr. Knight, Detective 
Vanderschaaf said that he did not. (Tr., p.84, Ls.5-11.) When asked if there was 
anything which would suggest Mr. Knight posed a threat to Detective Vanderschaaf or 
5 Detective Wadsworth testified that he discovered weapons while conducting the 
search of Mr. Ziebach's home. (Tr., p.29, Ls.3-25.) However, the weapons were 
discovered after Mr. Knight was searched by Detective Vanderschaaf. (Tr., p.30, L.18 -
p.31, L.4.) Moreover, there is no evidence indicating that Mr. Knight either knew about 
or had access to the weapons discovered in Mr. Ziebach's home. (See generally Tr.) 
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any other law enforcement, Detective Vanderschaaf said no. (Tr., p.84, Ls.15-18.) 
Detective Vanderschaaf also testified that he did not think that Mr. Knight posed a flight 
risk. (Tr., p.84 Ls.19-22.) Detective Wadsworth testified that Mr. Knight could not have 
fled and he did not pose a threat to officer safety. (Tr., p.30, Ls.1-11.) 
While Officer McClure and Detective Vanderschaaf had some prior contacts with 
Mr. Knight, the nature of those contacts were not in the record. (Tr., p. 40, L.25 - p.41, 
L.12, p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.15.) When asked if he was aware of Mr. Knight having a 
"history for weapons-type charges" Officer McClure testified, "Not as I recall." (Tr., p.47, 
L.25 - p.48, L.5.) Detective Wadsworth had no prior interactions with Mr. Knight and 
first "became familiar" with him after the search warrant was executed. (Tr., p.10, 
Ls.21-24.) 
Since there was no evidence that Mr. Knight possessed a weapon and no 
evidence that law enforcement perceived him as either a threat to safety or a flight risk, 
there were no particularized facts which would allow Detective Vanderschaaf to pat 
down Mr. Knight in a limited search for weapons. 
Even if this Court determines that there was a constitutional basis to search 
Mr. Knight for weapons, that basis abated after Detective Vanderschaaf determined that 
Mr. Knight did not have any weapons. Moreover, Detective Vanderschaaf's decision to 
manipulate the contents of Mr. Knight's pockets, after determining that he did not have 
any weapons, unconstitutionally exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry weapons 
frisk. The scope of a weapons frisk is "carefully limited" to a "search of the outer 
clothing." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. In the event an officer discovers an object but 
concludes it is not a weapon, the officer cannot further manipulate the object to 
ascertain the object's identity. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). 
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Detective Vanderschaaf testified that the purpose for his "pat-down" search of 
Mr. Knight was to locate either weapons or contraband. (Tr., p.76, Ls.6-14.) Detective 
Vanderschaaf testified that he felt something in Mr. Knight's pocket, but when asked if it 
felt like a weapon he said "No, it was something in his pocket." (Tr., p. 78, Ls.13-15, 
p.81, Ls.22-24, p.82, Ls.11-14.) When asked if he was squeezing and feeling for items 
during the initial pat down of Mr. Knight, Detective Vanderschaaf said yes. (Tr., p.78, 
Ls.4-15.) Detective Vanderschaaf provided the following testimony indicating that he 
could not tell what Mr. Knight had in his pocket: 
Q: When you conducted this initial pat-down of Mr. Knight and you felt 
this somethin~J could you, based on your training and experience as 
a police officer, your training and experience in a narcotics 
investigation, ascertain whether that something was contraband at 
any time? 
A: Just initially touching it? No. 
Q: Okay. There was nothing about the something that you felt that 
would suggest it was a meth pipe? Correct? 
A: No. 
Q: Nothing about it that suggested it was a bindle? Correct? 
A: Well, it was soft, so it could have been a bindle? 
Q: But you don't know for sure? 
A: No. 
Q: That would be pure speculation. Correct? 
A: Yes. 
(Tr., p.83, L.11 - p.84, L.4.) 
Even after illegally manipulating the contents of Mr. Knight's pocket Detective 
Vanderschaaf could not tell if the objects contained therein were contraband. It wasn't 
until he put his hand in Mr. Knight's pocket and pulled out the straw and the baggie that 
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he developed reasonable suspicion that Mr. Knight was in possession of 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.80, L.16 - p.81, L.3.) As such, Detective Vanderschaaf 
conducted another illegal search when he put his hand in Mr. Knight's pocket. 
In sum, there are no facts in this case which justify Detective Vanderschaaf's 
decision to search Mr. Knight for weapons. Even if there was a justification for the 
weapons frisk, Detective Vanderschaaf exceeded the scope of a permissible weapons 
frisk because Detective Vanderschaaf determined that Mr. Knight did not have a 
weapon, and then started manipulating the contents of Mr. Knight's pocket. Even after 
manipulating the contents of Mr. Knight's pocket, Detective Vanderschaaf could not tell 
what was in Mr. Knight's pocket. So again, Detective Vanderschaaf conducted another 
illegal search when he put his hand in Mr. Knight's pocket and removed the contents. 
Only after this third illegal search did Detective Vanderschaaf actually develop probable 
cause to think that Mr. Knight was in possession of a controlled substance. 
E. Detective Vanderschaaf's Search Of Mr. Knight Was Not Exempted From The 
Warrant Requirement Under The Consent Exception 
Another recognized exception from the warrant requirement is commonly 
referred to as the consent exception. A search conducted with freely given consent is 
an exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 
219 (1973). The State has the burden to demonstrate by the preponderance of the 
evidence that consent was freely and voluntarily given. State v. Mangum, 153 Idaho 
705, 714 (Ct. App. 2012). "It is well settled that when the basis for a search is consent, 
the State must conform its search to the limitations placed upon the right granted by the 
consent." Tyler, 153 Idaho at 626. "The standard for measuring the scope of consent 
under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness-what would the 
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typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and 
the suspect." Id. 
There is no evidence in the record indicating that Mr. Knight consented to either 
the general search of his person of the specific search of his pocket. Detective 
Wadsworth did not have a conversation with Mr. Knight so he did not know if Mr. Knight 
ever consented to a search. (Tr., p.30, Ls.12-17.) Detective Vanderschaaf testified that 
he could not remember if Mr. Knight gave him consent to conduct a "pat-down" search. 
(Tr., p.84, Ls.12-14.) As such, the consent exception to the warrant requirement is not 
applicable in this matter. 
F. The evidence Discovered During Detective Vanderschaaf's Illegal Search Of 
Mr. Knight Must Be Suppressed 
If it is determined that none of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant 
requirement were applicable at the time Detective Vanderschaaf searched Mr. Knight 
then that search was illegal. Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, the remedy is 
suppression of the State's evidence. State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927); State v. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992). Additionally, all of the incriminating evidence which 
was obtained subsequent to the illegal search should be excluded under the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine. "If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search 
must be excluded as the 'fruit of the poisonous tree." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 
961, 963 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). This 
includes all of the evidence used to establish a basis for Mr. Knight's possession 
conviction. 
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As a final note, the State argued to the district court that the inevitable discovery 
doctrine should apply in this matter preventing the suppression of the State's evidence. 
(R., pp.135-136.) "An exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery 
doctrine." State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915 (Ct. App. 2006). The inevitable 
discovery doctrine applies when a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that 
the information would have inevitably been discovered by lawful methods. Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984 ). In support of its inevitable discovery argument, the 
State points out that law enforcement had a predetermined plan to arrest everyone who 
was present at Mr. Ziebach's home for frequenting and that the evidence discovered 
during Detective Vanderschaaf's search of Mr. Knight would have been legally 
discovered during the booking procedures at the county jail. (R., pp.135-136.) This 
argument is flawed because, as argued above, Mr. Knight's presence alone at 
Mr. Ziebach's home at the time the search warrant was executed did not give rise to 
probable cause to arrest him for frequenting and there was no evidence discovered 
during the search of Mr. Ziebach's home which would have supplied probable cause to 
arrest Mr. Knight for frequenting. Again, the evidence discovered at Mr. Ziebach's 
home was located in a safe, which was located in a closet of Mr. Ziebach's master 
bedroom. (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-16.) Assuming that Mr. Knight was not searched by Detective 
Vanderschaaf, there still would not have been enough evidence to arrest Mr. Knight for 
frequenting. As such, the inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable under the facts 
present in this matter. 
In sum, the evidence discovered when Detective Vanderschaaf illegally searched 
Mr. Knight should be suppressed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Knight respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 26th day of December, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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